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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What choice does a mother have when she must balance an eight-hour workday 
with breastfeeding her baby?  The answer to this dilemma seems simple at first: 
express breast milk by utilizing a breast pump at the workplace.  But to complicate 
matters, the employee learns that her work schedule will require her to wait five 
hours before she can pump.  Prior to the commencement of her new job, she 
approaches her employer with her concerns.  She discovers her employer permits all 
employees to take impromptu breaks to use the restroom to tend to bodily functions, 
but the employer instructs her to only pump her breasts during her lunch break.  She 
is banished to an unsanitary restroom stall to pump, and her employer even refuses 
her polite request for a chair to sit down.  She tries her best to conform to her 
employer’s demands, but her breasts refuse to operate on a schedule.  They become 
painfully engorged, and by lunch her shirt is wet from leaking breast milk.  The pain 
becomes unbearable so she decides to take an impromptu break to pump, but her 
employer terminates her for doing so.  Is this a case of sex discrimination?   
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio seemed poised to answer this question 
when it granted certiorari to hear the appeal of Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp.1  It had 
been widely expected that the court would address this specific issue. 
Disappointingly, the splintered court in Totes/Isotoner decided to completely avoid 
the question.  This result has left Ohio employers and employees unsure about 
whether discrimination on the basis of lactation is permissible.   
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to affirm the summary judgment in favor 
of Totes opened the door for employers to implement facially discriminatory 
employment policies that single out lactating women.  Because the court did not 
decide whether discrimination on the basis of lactation is prohibited by the Ohio Fair 
Employment Practices Act2 (FEPA), as amended by the Ohio Pregnancy 
                                                          
 
1
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009). 
 
2
 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2008).  It is unlawful 
[f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, national 
origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to 
refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, 
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Discrimination Act3 (PDA), Ohio’s appellate districts will likely conflict over this 
issue.  In the future litigation of a lactation discrimination case, a successful 
argument can be made to convince an Ohio court that discrimination on the basis of 
lactation is considered pregnancy discrimination under Ohio law since “lactation is 
‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy’ and . . . women who are lactating are 
women ‘affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth.’”4    
Part II of this Note will explain the relevant statutory and case law background 
behind pregnancy and lactation discrimination at both the federal and state levels. 
Part III.A will explain why the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to affirm the 
appellate court’s grant of summary judgment was improper.  Part III.B will explain 
why the Supreme Court of Ohio’s analysis of the accommodation issue is incorrect. 
Part IV.A will describe how this improper decision could open the door to facially 
discriminatory workplace policies that discriminate against lactating employees.  
Part IV.B will explain how this decision will lead to future conflicts among the Ohio 
appellate districts.  Part IV.C will make a recommendation of how Ohio employers 
should treat their lactating employees in light of this recent decision.  Part V will 
offer guidance on how to successfully litigate a lactation discrimination case in Ohio.  
Part V.A will explain why it is important to distinguish breastfeeding from lactation.  
Part V.B will provide employment law litigators with a strong argument to convince 
an Ohio court that lactation discrimination is included within the scope of a the Ohio 
Pregnancy Discrimination statute.  Part V.C will explore potential legislative 
initiatives that would provide protection to breastfeeding employees who need to 
express breast milk at the workplace.   
II.  BACKGROUND: PREGNANCY AND LACTATION DISCRIMINATION 
A.  General Electric Co. v. Gilbert5 
The U.S. Supreme Court case General Electric Co. v. Gilbert was the first case 
to interpret whether pregnancy discrimination could be considered sex 
discrimination as defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6  In this case, 
the employer provided disability benefit coverage for all disabilities except 
disabilities arising due to pregnancy.7  The Court utilized a comparability analysis in 
which it compared a class of pregnant employees with a class of non-pregnant 
employees.8  The Court noted that the class of pregnant women was comprised 
entirely of female employees, while the class containing non-pregnant employees 
                                                          
tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or 
indirectly related to employment. 
Id. 
 
3
 See id. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009). 
 
4
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alternation in original).  
 
5
 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 
6
 Id.  
 
7
 Id. at 127. 
 
8
 Id. at 134-35. 
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was comprised of both male and female employees.9  The Court held that sex 
discrimination only occurs when a class of women is disadvantaged in comparison to 
a class comprised entirely of men.10 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent for the Gilbert decision.11  Justices Brennan and 
Marshall joined the dissenting opinion that argued the proper classifications to 
determine whether sex discrimination existed were classes comprised of those at risk 
of pregnancy and those who were not at risk of pregnancy.12  The three justices 
concluded that because women were the only sex at risk of becoming pregnant, they 
were being discriminated against because of their sex.13 
B.  The Federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 197814 
In 1978, two years after the Gilbert decision, Congress amended Title VII with 
the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).15  This amendment 
reversed the Gilbert holding and provided that pregnancy discrimination was a per 
se violation of Title VII because pregnancy discrimination is a per se form of sex 
discrimination.16  However, several federal courts still apply the logic behind the 
Gilbert majority opinion despite the fact that Congress rejected this logic when it 
passed the federal PDA.17  An inquiry into the legislative history behind the federal 
                                                          
 
9
 Id. at 135.  
 
10
 Id. at 136. 
 
11
 Id. at 160-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 
12
 Id. at 161-62.  Justice Brennan pointed out how flawed the majority’s sex-neutral 
approach was when he discussed how the plan also covered male-specific procedures such as 
circumcisions, prostatectomies, and vasectomies.  Id. at 152-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
13
 Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens noted that “[b]y definition, [a 
benefit policy excluding disabilities arising from pregnancy] discriminates on account of sex; 
for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the 
male.”  Id.  
 
14
 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2006) (amending Title VII’s terms “because of sex” and “on the 
basis of sex” to include pregnancy). 
 
15
 The amendment provides: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits 
under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work . . . . 
Id. 
 
16
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978). 
 
17
 Cases in which federal courts have dismissed claims brought by female employees 
based on sex-specific biological differences include: Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 
305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing the majority opinion in Gilbert to deny a claim for sex 
discrimination based on breastfeeding); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 
(W.D. Ky. 1990) (citing the majority opinion in Gilbert to deny a claim for sex discrimination 
based on breastfeeding).  “Failing to recognize and provide remedies for women facing 
discrimination perpetuates an unequal work situation, which is a result of courts attempting to 
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PDA reveals that Congress outrightly disapproved of the logic in Gilbert.18  
Although the legislative history and intent behind the federal PDA reveals that 
Congress rejected both the reasoning and holding in Gilbert, many federal courts 
have ignored this fact by construing the federal PDA with a very narrow 
interpretation that the PDA only carved out one exception, pregnancy itself. 
C.  The Ohio Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores19 
In 1980, after Congress enacted the federal PDA, Ohio enacted its own version of 
the PDA.20  The Ohio General Assembly amended its state Title VII counterpart, 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A), by instituting the Ohio PDA.21  The Sixth 
Circuit recently interpreted the legislative intent behind the Ohio PDA: 
Having incorporated the [federal] PDA’s language almost verbatim 
into the definitional provisions of § 4112, it is clear to us that the Ohio 
Legislature was aware of the meaning and rationale of Gilbert, as well as 
being aware of the [federal] PDA.  The Legislature made a conscious 
choice to extend the definition of discrimination to include pregnancy 
even though there cannot be a class of similarly situated males.22 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the legislature intended to limit the type of 
pregnancy discrimination claims based on sex discrimination to claims of 
employment discrimination.  The Sixth Circuit took notice of the fact that Ohio 
adopted its version of the PDA in 1980, which was three years before the U.S. 
Supreme Court explicitly held that the federal PDA overruled the Gilbert decision.23    
 Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores is an important case because it is the first time 
any court considered whether breastfeeding women qualified as a protected class 
from discrimination under Ohio law.24  This case dealt with plaintiff mothers who 
                                                          
ignore biological truths in favor of a supposed gender-blind justice and serves only to 
perpetuate the status quo.”  Maureen E. Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology, 
Gender, and Discrimination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 882 (2005). 
 
18
 “It is the committee’s view that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted [Title VII in 
Gilbert].”  H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2.  “[I]t seems only commonsense, that since only women 
can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination 
against women . . . .”  123 CONG. REC. 10581 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins).   
 
19
 Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Derungs II), 374 F.3d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that Ohio’s Public Accommodation Statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G), 
does not prohibit owners of places of public accommodation from restricting breastfeeding in 
such places). 
 
20
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009). 
 
21
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 436. 
 
22
 Id. 
 
23
 Id. (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 
(1983)).  This fact seems irrelevant given that the legislative history of the federal PDA 
clearly evidences that Congress fully intended to overrule the Gilbert decision five years prior 
to Newport News.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-948. 
 
24
 Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Derungs I), 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (S.D. Ohio 
2000), aff’d, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004) (referring to the issue of breastfeeding 
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were restricted from breastfeeding at defendant Wal-Mart’s stores in Ohio.25  The 
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit claiming Wal-Mart discriminated against them because of 
their sex.26  Plaintiffs argued that Ohio’s public accommodation statute (OPAS),27 
which prohibits sex discrimination, provided breastfeeding mother with the right to 
breastfeed in any place of public accommodation.28  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on the sex discrimination claim.29  The 
plaintiffs appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit and sought review of the sex 
discrimination issue.30 
The Sixth Circuit’s first step in its analysis was to look at the Ohio Legislature’s 
intent behind its enactment of OPAS.31  The court determined that the Ohio 
Legislature intended to limit claims of pregnancy discrimination to employment 
discrimination claims.32  The second step in the court’s analysis was the application 
of federal employment law by way of a comparability analysis.33  By utilizing the 
Gilbert comparability analysis, the court curiously compared how Wal-Mart treated 
breastfeeding women with how it treated breastfeeding men and concluded that there 
was no sex discrimination because both subclasses were treated in the same 
manner.34  The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and 
                                                          
discrimination under Ohio law as a matter of first impression because it has not yet been 
decided by a federal or Ohio state court prior to this case).  
 
25
 Id. at 885. 
 
26
 Id. 
 
27
 OPAS provides: 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any proprietor or any 
employee, keeper, or manager of a place of public accommodation to deny to any 
person, except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, 
religion, sex, military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry, the full 
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of 
public accommodation. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (West 2008). 
 
28
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 430.  This case was initially filed in state court but was removed 
to federal court on diversity of citizenship.  Id.   
 
29
 Derungs I, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 894. 
 
30
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 431 n.1 (stating that plaintiffs waived appeal of their tort and 
age discrimination claims and were only appealing their sex discrimination claim).  
 
31
 Id. at 436 (stating that because the legislature only amended sections (A)-(F) of the 
Ohio Civil Rights Act with the Ohio PDA’s definition of pregnancy as sex discrimination, the 
legislature did not intend to include the definition of pregnancy discrimination as sex 
discrimination in section (G), which pertains to public accommodations). 
 
32
 Id. 
 
33
 Id. at 435-36 (concluding that since Ohio passed OPAS before the Supreme Court 
overruled Gilbert with Newport News, the reasoning of the Gilbert majority could correctly be 
applied to the interpretation of OPAS).  The court fails to acknowledge that the federal PDA 
overruled Gilbert five years prior to the Newport News decision. 
 
34
 Id. at 437. 
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found that OPAS does not prohibit restrictions on public breastfeeding because its 
prohibition does not constitute discrimination based on sex.35 
D.  Ohio’s Protection of Public Breastfeeding 
Many states have exempted public breastfeeding from their criminal indecent 
exposure statutes.36  Ohio does not have statutory language to exempt breastfeeding 
from its indecent exposure statutes.  However, an Ohio Court of Appeals interpreted 
Ohio’s indecent exposure statute as though it excluded the criminalization of 
exposure of female breasts.37  Following the Derungs decision, the Ohio Legislature 
adopted legislation to protect public breastfeeding.38  This legislation partially 
overruled the Derungs decision.39  This law went into effect on September 16, 
2005.40   
E.  Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp. 
1.  Facts of the Case 
In July 2005, Totes hired LiNisa Allen through Star Personnel, a temporary 
service.41  When Allen was initially hired, she was still breastfeeding her five-month-
old baby.42  When she was unavailable to breastfeed, she used a breast pump to 
express the breast milk from her breasts.43  It took Allen approximately fifteen 
minutes to pump, including the time required to unpack and repack her pump.44  
Allen needed to pump because “her breasts would enlarge to a point where they 
would start leaking all over her shirt,” and if she became engorged she would suffer 
from severe back pain.45 
                                                          
 
35
 Id. at 436-37 (concluding that the statutory language and the legislative history of OPAS 
do not include breastfeeding discrimination as sex discrimination). 
 
36
 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 2010) (excluding breastfeeding from 
an indecent exposure statute which prohibits public exposure of female breasts). 
 
37
 State v. Jetter, 599 N.E.2d 733, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (concluding that 
the Ohio public indecent exposure statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.09, does not consider 
female breasts a private part).  This effectively exempts public breastfeeding from the Ohio 
public indecent expsoure statute. 
 
38
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (“A mother is entitled to breast-feed her 
baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is 
permitted.”). 
 
39
 Id.  This law amends the building standards code rather than amending OPAS or the 
Ohio Civil Rights Act. 
 
40
 See id.  
 
41
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp. (Totes/Isotoner trial court), No. CV06-03-0917, slip op. 
at 2 (Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. July 31, 2007), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009). 
 
42
 Id.  
 
43
 Id.  
 
44
 Id.  
 
45
 Id.  
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
272 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:265 
 
On July 25, 2006, Allen attended an orientation session at the Totes facility prior 
to the commencement of her new job.46  At this orientation, Allen was provided with 
her work schedule.  Her work day lasted from 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., with two ten-
minute breaks at 8:00 a.m. and at 1:00 p.m. and a half-hour lunch break at 11:00 
a.m.47 
Allen approached Angel Gravett at the end of the orientation session to inform 
her that she was breastfeeding her baby.48  Allen notified her that she needed a place 
to pump her breasts.49  Later in the day, Gravett contacted “Allen by phone and told 
her she could pump her breasts in the women’s restroom during her lunch break.”50  
Allen told Gravett that she would attempt to wait until 11:00 a.m. to pump her 
breasts, but “she didn’t know if she could.”51  Allen requested a chair so she would 
have a place to sit, but Totes denied her request.52   
After about a week Allen found that she was unable to wait until 11:00 a.m. to 
pump.53  Consequently, she began taking one additional break at 10:00 a.m. to 
pump.54  On August 16, 2006, Karen Kidder, a supervisor, observed Allen pumping 
her breasts in the restroom.55  Soon afterwards, Gravett confronted Allen about 
taking an “unauthorized break.”56  Allen told Gravett that “she could not wait until 
11:00 a.m. to pump her breasts.”57 
Allen asked Kidder to extend her morning break from 10 minutes to 15 minutes 
so she would have adequate time to pump her breasts on her break.58  Kidder brought 
Allen’s request to Fred James and he “made the decision to terminate Allen for not 
following company rules” because she took an unauthorized break.59 
2.  Procedural History 
“On March 16, 2006 [Allen] filed a complaint against Totes alleging three counts 
of discrimination: (1) violation of Ohio’s prohibition against gender discrimination, 
(2) violation of Ohio public policy, and (3) violation of Ohio’s prohibition against 
disability discrimination.”60  Totes moved for summary judgment on all of the 
                                                          
 
46
 Id.  
 
47
 Id.  
 
48
 Id.  
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Id. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Id. 
 
53
 Id. at 3. 
 
54
 Id.  
 
55
 Id.  
 
56
 Id.  
 
57
 Id.  
 
58
 Id. 
 
59
 Id. 
 
60
 Id.  
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claims.61  This Note will focus on Count I of the complaint which alleges sex 
discrimination.  The Court of Common Pleas in Butler County granted summary 
judgment in favor of Totes; Allen appealed.62  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court.63  Subsequently, Allen’s appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio.64 
The trial court found that Allen failed to assert a prima facie case of pregnancy 
discrimination.65  The court stated, “Allen gave birth over five months prior to her 
termination from Totes.  Pregnant woman [sic] who give birth and chose not to 
breastfeed or pump their breasts do not continue to lactate for five months.”66  The 
court decided that Allen’s condition of lactation related to breastfeeding, not to 
pregnancy.67  It reasoned that breastfeeding discrimination is not gender 
discrimination.68 
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment.  However, it held that 
Allen “was not terminated because she was lactating, pumping breast milk, or 
needed to take a break to pump breast milk.”69  Instead, the court concluded she was 
terminated “for taking an unauthorized, extra break (unlike the restroom breaks 
which were authorized and available to all of the employees, appellant included).”70 
The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted Allen’s appeal in order to review the issue 
of whether Ohio law prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee 
due to lactation.71  This appeal resulted in a divided court.  Justice Lanzinger would 
have dismissed the appeal as having been improperly granted.72  In a per curiam 
decision the Supreme Court of Ohio held that Totes had articulated a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Allen.  She had failed to follow directions 
and this was not a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.73  Justice Lundberg Stratton, 
Justice O’Donnell, and Justice Cupp concurred in affirming the summary judgment, 
however, they decided not to address whether discrimination on the basis of lactation 
                                                          
 
61
 Id. at 3-4. 
 
62
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp. (Totes/Isotoner appellate court), No. CA2007-08-196, 
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *1 (Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2008), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 
2009). 
 
63
 Id. at *4. 
 
64
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 623 (Ohio 2009) (per curiam). 
 
65
 Totes/Isotoner trial court, slip op. at 6-7. 
 
66
 Id. at 7. 
 
67
 Id. 
 
68
 Id. at 7 (citing Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428, 439 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 
69
 Totes/Isotoner appellate court, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *3. 
 
70
 Id. (citing Popp v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., No. CA2005-03-058, 2005 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4876 (Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2005)). 
 
71
 Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d at 623. 
 
72
 Id. at 624. 
 
73
 Id. 
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is prohibited by Ohio law because they felt their opinion would be advisory.74  
Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion and Chief Justice Moyer 
joined.  This concurring opinion also affirmed the summary judgment but disagreed 
that an opinion would be advisory on the issue of lactation discrimination.75  Justice 
O’Connor felt that this issue was not rendered moot by granting summary judgment 
to Totes.  Instead, she determined that “the issues are live ones, not remote 
possibilities or based on controversies that may never occur.”76  She came to the 
conclusion that lactation is a condition relating to pregnancy.  She stated she would 
“hold that gender-discrimination claims arising from lactation are cognizable under 
Ohio’s FEPA as amended by the PDA.”77   
Justice Pfeifer was the only dissenting justice.  He decided that granting 
summary judgment to Totes was improper.  He was troubled by the fact that the 
record did not explain why Allen’s restroom trips made outside of scheduled breaks 
were different from the restroom trips other employees made outside of their 
scheduled breaks.78  He noted that Allen was the only one fired for taking these 
unscheduled restroom breaks and consequently, she should have an opportunity to 
prove her claim to a jury.  Justice Pfeifer would have held “that employment 
discrimination due to lactation is unlawful pursuant to R.C. 4112.01(B).”79 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO’S DECISION 
In its per curiam decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to answer 
whether discrimination due to lactation constitutes sex discrimination.80  In 
particular, the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to determine whether this form of 
discrimination is included within the scope of the Ohio FEPA, as amended by the 
PDA.81  Chief Justice Moyer, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Pfeifer were in 
agreement that “[sex]-discrimination claims arising from lactation are cognizable 
under Ohio’s FEPA as amended by the PDA.”82  However, it remains unclear 
whether the other four justices agreed or disagreed with this premise.  Consequently, 
female employees remain unsure about whether they are protected under Ohio law if 
they choose to return to work and pump milk in the workplace for their breastfeeding 
child.   
A.  The Supreme Court of Ohio Incorrectly Affirmed the Grant of Summary 
Judgment 
Under Ohio law, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination by applying the standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
                                                          
 
74
 Id. at 625 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). 
 
75
 Id. at 625-26 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
76
 Id. at 627. 
 
77
 Id. at 630. 
 
78
 Id. at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 
79
 Id. 
 
80
 Id. at 624 (per curiam). 
 
81
 Id. 
 
82
 Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Green.83  Under this standard, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) she is a member of a 
protected class; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that she was 
qualified for the position; and (4) either that she was replaced by someone outside 
the protected class or that a comparable, non-protected person was treated more 
favorably.”84  Once a prima facie case is established, “the burden of production shifts 
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment 
of the plaintiff.”85  The record in the present case provides a basis from which a jury 
could conclude that Totes failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for Allen’s termination.  Regrettably, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the 
appellate court when it cited Allen’s unauthorized breaks from her workstation as a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Allen’s termination.86    
Two arguments can be made to support the fact that summary judgment was 
improperly granted for Totes.  First, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
Allen carried out any act of insubordination when she used the restroom to pump her 
breasts during an impromptu break.  As offensive as it may be, Totes did in fact 
classify pumping breast milk as a restroom function.87  This is illustrated by Manager 
Angel Garrett’s actions when she responded to Allen’s request for a private place to 
pump by telling her to use the restroom.88  If the benefit of the facts is given to Allen, 
as the non-moving party, it is apparent she was following the impromptu break 
policy permitting “restroom breaks which were authorized and available to all of the 
employees”89 when she was observed pumping milk by her supervisor.  This creates 
a genuine issue of fact as to whether taking “unauthorized breaks” was the true 
reason for Allen’s termination, or if it was just a pretext for discrimination against a 
lactating employee. 
Secondly, assuming Allen did engage in insubordination, her only act of 
insubordination in the record was failing to follow an employer’s facially 
discriminatory impromptu break policy.  In light of this alleged insubordination, her 
claim is still sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.  Gravett directed 
Allen to pump her breasts during her 11:00 a.m. lunch break.90  Meanwhile, 
impromptu breaks were available to all employees throughout the workday to tend to 
                                                          
 
83
 James v. Delphi Auto. Sys., No. 04AP-215, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4941, at *4 (Ct. 
App. Oct. 14, 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).  
 
84
 Id. 
 
85
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 623 (citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship 
Comm. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n, 421 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio 1981)). 
 
86
 Id. at 624. 
 
87
 Many states have explicitly stated in their statutes that a woman who wishes to 
breastfeed or pump breast milk must be provided with a private space that is not a bathroom 
stall.  An example of this statutory language can be found in Vermont under VT. STAT. ANN 
tit. 21, § 305 (2008). 
 
88
 Totes/Isotoner trial court, No. CV06-03-0917, slip op. at 2 (Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 
July 31, 2007), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009). 
 
89
  Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Totes/Isotoner 
appellate court, No. CA2007-08-196, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *3 (Ct. App. Apr. 7, 
2008)). 
 
90
 Totes/Isotoner trial court, slip op. at 2. 
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bodily functions.91  Lactation is a bodily function, but the record reflects that Totes 
specifically excluded breast pumping from its impromptu break policy and classified 
it as an unauthorized break activity.92  This break policy is facially discriminatory 
because it singled out lactating women.93  Justice Pfeifer correctly indentified the 
problems with singling out Allen’s breaks in his dissenting opinion: 
The appellate court does not explain why Allen’s trips to the restroom 
outside scheduled break times were different from the restroom trips other 
employees made outside scheduled break times.  There is no evidence in 
the record about any limit on the length of unscheduled restroom breaks 
and no evidence that employees had to seek permission from a supervisor 
to take an unscheduled restroom break.  There is evidence only that 
unscheduled bathroom breaks were allowed and that LaNisa Allen was 
fired for taking them.  What made her breaks different?94 
Consequently, Totes cannot meet its burden of production to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment of Allen by stating that she failed to 
follow a facially discriminatory break policy.   
The Supreme Court of Ohio should have utilized an analysis similar to the 
reasoning found in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC95 to 
analyze the present case.  In Newport News, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized a 
comparability approach to conclude that the medical plan benefits policy was 
facially discriminatory because of sex.96  The Court compared two classes: the 
husbands of female employees (a class not at risk of pregnancy) with the wives of 
male employees (a class at risk of pregnancy).97  Even though all of the employees’ 
                                                          
 
91
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Totes/Isotoner 
appellate court, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *3). 
 
92
 See id.  Allen was terminated for failure to follow directions after she was observed 
pumping breast milk around 10:00 a.m.  Totes/Isotoner trial court, slip op. at 3. 
 
93
 Justice O’Connor notes that Allen argued the break policy was facially discriminatory: 
Allen’s claims of discrimination appear predicated on a disparate-treatment theory.  
She asserts, “The workrule that [she] allegedly violated was the one that restricted the 
time she could pump her breast milk to her lunch break.  Totes placed no such 
restrictions on any other employee who needed to leave his or her workstation to tend 
to a bodily function or bodily discomfort, only upon lactating women.  The work rule 
was itself discriminatory, since it placed extra restrictions on women experiencing a 
physical act of pregnancy.” 
Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original). 
 
94
 Id. at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  
 
95
 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).  This was 
the first Supreme Court decision to interpret the federal PDA after it was passed in 1978.  The 
rationale in this case is relevant to the Ohio PDA because it is adopted of the federal PDA’s 
statutory language verbatim.   
 
96
 Id. at 683-84. 
 
97
 Id.  As other authors have noted, Justice Stevens utilized a comparability analysis in the 
Gilbert dissenting opinion: 
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spouses received the same “specified level of hospitalization coverage for all 
conditions; the wives of male employees receive[d] such coverage except for 
pregnancy related conditions.”98  This benefit policy is analogous to the impromptu 
break policy found in Totes.  All employees were afforded the opportunity to utilize 
their impromptu breaks for the same authorized bodily functions, such as urination 
and defecation.  However, employees at risk of lactation (women) were afforded 
these breaks to attend to bodily functions except for lactation-related activities such 
as expressing milk.  According to the record, the employer did not place any 
limitations on the type of bodily functions that employees who are not at risk of 
lactation (men) were able to take.  The employer also did not state that it placed any 
time restrictions on the length of time employees could spend on an impromptu 
break to tend to their bodily functions.99  Therefore, parallel to the holding in 
Newport News,100 this employer policy disadvantages only female employees and is 
facially discriminatory because of sex. 
Totes was fully aware that Allen was a breastfeeding mother and required a time 
and a place to express breast milk at the workplace.  Totes designed its impromptu 
break policy to exclude pumping breast milk and required Allen to adhere to this 
break policy when she was physically incapable of doing so.  An employee plaintiff 
can establish a prima facie case by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent.101  Totes’ impromptu break policy is a facially discriminatory employment 
policy.102  “[A] facially discriminatory employment policy . . . is direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent.”103  In a case containing direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent, once a plaintiff shows that the prohibited classification was a motivating 
factor in the employment decision, the burden of production and persuasion shifts to 
the employer.  The employer must prove that it would have terminated the employee 
even if it had not been motivated by impermissible discrimination.104  Totes did not 
                                                          
A principal argument of the dissenters was that the majority had misstated the 
composition of the two relevant classes.  Rather than the majority’s conception of 
there being a class of pregnant workers and a class of non-pregnant workers, the 
dissenters argued that the more accurate characterization was “between persons who 
face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not.”  
Henry Wyatt Christrup, Note, Litigating a Breastfeeding and Employment Case in the New 
Millennium, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 263, 279-80 (2000) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 161 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 
98
 Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added). 
 
99
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 
100
 The employer policy in Newport News was found to be facially discriminatory because 
of sex since it disadvantaged only male employees.  Id.  
 
101
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 
102
 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 
103
 Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 
600, 8 F.3d 376, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1993)). 
 
104
 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45; Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 
F.3d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1994). 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
278 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:265 
 
meet its burden of production or persuasion to prove that it terminated Allen for a 
reason not motivated by impermissible discrimination.105   
The courts’ fixation on “extra, unauthorized breaks” may have blinded both the 
lower courts and the Supreme Court of Ohio in their analysis.  This fixation likely 
caused the judges to overlook performing a complete analysis to determine whether 
the impromptu break policy was indeed facially discriminatory.  It is logical to 
believe the judges were motivated to prevent a plaintiff from recovering from an 
employer after she admitted to taking a paid fifteen-minute break everyday for two 
weeks.  However, this form of post hoc analysis is inappropriate and the lower 
courts, in addition to the Supreme Court of Ohio, should have performed a suitable 
analysis to determine that the impromptu break was facially discriminatory. 
B.  The Supreme Court of Ohio Got the Sex Discrimination Analysis Wrong on the 
Accommodation Issue for Lactating Employees 
The Supreme Court of Ohio misinterpreted the lactation accommodation 
argument made in Totes/Isotoner.  The accommodation issue argued by Allen was 
not whether Totes was required to accommodate her lactating condition under the 
Ohio PDA by providing her with special additional breaks above and beyond what 
other employees were receiving.  Instead, Allen argued her need to express breast 
milk should have been accommodated by allowing her to spend her impromptu 
breaks pumping milk to relieve her discomfort.  Justice O’Connor rebuts this 
argument by asserting that “[t]he FEPA and the PDA mandate that an employer treat 
pregnancy with neutrality, but not preferentially.”106  This premise of law does not 
support this argument because Allen was not asking for preferential treatment.  
Alternatively, she was asking to be treated the same as all the other non-lactating 
employees by not having restrictions placed on the types of bodily functions she was 
permitted to attend to during an impromptu break.  Allen would have been asking for 
a special accommodation if she had been fired because she took an impromptu break 
when her employer prohibited impromptu breaks for all of its employees.  The 
Supreme Court of Ohio misinterpreted Allen’s argument that her lactation needs 
should have been accommodated. 
IV.  IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO’S DECISION 
A.  Opening the Door to Lactation Discrimination in Ohio by Permitting Employers 
to Rebut a Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination with Plaintiff’s Violation of a 
Facially Discriminatory Employment Policy 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s reliance on the conclusory analysis at the appellate 
court level ignores the fact that lactation is a sex-specific bodily function.  The 
appellate court dismissed the idea that the impromptu break policy was 
discriminatory on its face because Allen “was simply and plainly terminated . . . for 
taking an unauthorized, extra break (unlike the restroom breaks which were 
                                                          
 
105
 One way that Totes could have met this burden is by supplying evidence that it 
terminated other non-lactating employees for taking impromptu breaks that lasted fifteen 
minutes or longer.   
 
106
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
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authorized and available to all of the employees, appellant included).”107  The use of 
this “sex-neutral comparability analysis in [lactation], as in pregnancy employment 
cases, for example, could potentially allow employers to discriminate based on a 
characteristic that only women posses as a pretext for discrimination based on their 
sex.”108 
For example, if an employer permits employees to take impromptu breaks to tend 
to only particular bodily functions, it can be inferred from the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s decision that it would be permissible for an employer to rightfully terminate a 
lactating employee for tending to any lactation-related activities during such breaks.  
These lactation-related activities could include changing the wet nursing pads in her 
bra.109  She could also be terminated for taking a break to change her shirt when it 
becomes saturated with breast milk as a result of becoming engorged.  As long as the 
lactating employee was able to take breaks to urinate and defecate, which are sex-
neutral and “authorized and available to all of the employees,”110 she can still be 
rightfully terminated for tending to any sex-specific bodily functions outside these 
stipulated activities under the guise of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason of 
insubordination.  An example of a facially discriminatory employment policy 
outside of the realm of breaks which would be deemed permissible under this sex-
neutral logic includes a policy where an employer could ban the use of breast pumps 
entirely on the employer’s premise because all other employees would also be 
banned from using a breast pump on the premises.111  The implications of allowing 
an employer to single out lactation-related activities from its employment policies 
are inherently discouraging to breastfeeding women who are trying to balance their 
careers while providing what they feel is the best nourishment available to their 
children.  
                                                          
 
107
 Id. at 627.  
 
108
 Brianne Whelan, Comment, For Crying Out Loud: Ohio’s Legal Battle with Public 
Breastfeeding and Hope for the Future, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 669, 698 
(2005) (citing Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[f]inding 
that ‘tasteless and offensive’ remarks directed towards an employee pumping her breast milk 
did not constitute sex discrimination”)).  
 
109
 It is recommended that nursing pads be changed as soon as they become damp to avoid 
the risk of infection.  See Mastitis While Breast-Feeding – Home Treatment, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/parenting/baby/tc/mastitis-while-breast-feeding-home-treatment (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2011).  It is foreseeable that this could result in a lactating employee needing to 
take frequent breaks.  Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe an employer may wish to 
terminate an employee that requires more frequent breaks than a non-lactating employee.   
 
110
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
111
 It is simple to see that this employment policy is facially discriminatory because of sex 
as only females have to ability to utilize a breast pump because they are the only sex that is 
able to lactate.  Therefore, a sex neutral comparison approach toward evaluating employment 
policies to see if they are facially discriminatory is entirely inappropriate.    
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B.  The Supreme Court of Ohio’s Refusal to Clarify Whether Lactation 
Discrimination Is a Cognizable Claim Will Cause Conflicts Among the Ohio 
Appellate Districts 
Totes/Isotoner marks the first time the issue of lactation discrimination has been 
raised in Ohio.112  Despite this fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio still elected to avoid 
determining whether Allen had established a prima facie case of pregnancy 
discrimination.113  As a result, some of Ohio’s appellate districts will likely rely on 
unsuitable federal court interpretations of the federal PDA in order to interpret the 
Ohio PDA in future instances of lactation discrimination in Ohio.  This is precisely 
what happened at the trial court level of Totes/Isotoner.   
The Totes/Isotoner trial court relied on the Sixth Circuit opinion in Derungs v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.114  The extensive reliance on this federal case was 
inappropriate because this case illustrates the issue of discrimination in a public 
accommodation context; it does not represent a case of employment 
discrimination.115  In Derungs, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of 
the Ohio PDA and determined that the Ohio General Assembly only intended to 
permit pregnancy discrimination claims to extend to those claims arising from issues 
in the workplace, not from issues of public accommodation.116  The court came to 
this conclusion because the General Assembly amended § 4112.02(A) with the Ohio 
PDA, but it failed to amend § 4112.02(G).  Thereby, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that 
the Ohio Legislature purposely chose to limit the scope of pregnancy discrimination 
claims to the workplace context.117  The Sixth Circuit relied strictly on statutory 
interpretation when it stated “breastfeeding discrimination does not constitute gender 
discrimination” in the public accommodations context.118  The Sixth Circuit was not 
                                                          
 
112
 See Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d 622. 
 
113
 See id. at 623-24. 
 
114
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 
115
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (West 2008) governs public accommodations while 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2008) governs employment discrimination.  It is 
unlawful discriminatory practice:  
For any proprietor or any employee, keeper, or manager of a place of public 
accommodation to deny to any person, except for reasons applicable alike to all 
persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin, 
disability, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, or privileges of the place of public accommodation. 
Id. § 4112.02(G). 
 
116
 See Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 436-37; see generally Katherine A. Macfarlane, Comment, 
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores: Another Door Shut—A Federal Interpretation Excluding 
Breastfeeding from the Scope of a State’s Sex Discrimination Protection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 2319, 2320-22 (2005).  The issue of lactation discrimination under Ohio law should not 
be left to the federal courts to interpret.  Derungs is a perfect example of a federal court 
overstepping its bounds to decide matters of state law.  The question in this case should have 
been certified for the Supreme Court of Ohio to decide.  Id. 
 
117
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 437. 
 
118
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Derungs II, 374 
F.3d at 439).   
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stating that breastfeeding discrimination did not apply to the workplace context 
because the employment section of the statute had already been amended by the 
Ohio PDA to prohibit pregnancy discrimination.119  The Supreme Court of Ohio 
should have clarified that lactation discrimination is a form of pregnancy 
discrimination in order to prevent Ohio appellate districts from erroneously applying 
federal cases such as Derungs. 
Similarly, other Ohio appellate districts may choose to reject the flawed Derungs 
rationale that “breastfeeding discrimination does not constitute gender 
discrimination.”120  The Supreme Court of Ohio never explicitly overruled or 
affirmed the Totes/Isotoner trial court’s reliance on this federal court decision.121  
Instead, it let “stand the appellate court’s holding that LaNisa Allen was fired for 
leaving her post without permission rather than for pumping her breasts . . . leaving 
unanswered the question of whether she even asserted a cognizable cause of 
action.”122  Some appellate districts may decide to recognize that lactation 
discrimination is a cognizable claim if they chose to follow Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion.  Justice O’Connor stated she “would hold that gender-
discrimination claims arising from lactation are cognizable under Ohio’s FEPA as 
amended by the PDA.”123  However, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s refusal to clarify 
whether lactation discrimination is a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under 
Ohio law encourages inconsistency in the future decisions among Ohio’s appellate 
districts because it remains unclear how Ohio’s employment discrimination 
legislation should be interpreted on this issue.     
C.  Recommendation for Ohio Employers   
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Ohio neglected to recognize a facially 
discriminatory employment policy,124 it is advisable that employers should still make 
a good faith effort to prevent discrimination against lactating employees in the 
workplace.  If another lactation discrimination case arises with a plaintiff who 
survives the employer’s rebuttal of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for termination, it appears possible that a majority of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio would hold that lactation discrimination is a form of pregnancy discrimination.  
Justice O’Connor, the late Chief Justice Moyer, and Justice Pfeifer agreed that sex 
discrimination includes lactation discrimination.  Consequently, Ohio employers 
should not interpret the Totes/Isotoner decision as a carte blanche to deny lactating 
employees equal treatment in the workplace. 
                                                          
 
119
 The Derungs decision has since been partially overruled by the Ohio General Assembly 
when it enacted Senate Bill 41 (2005) which provides: “A mother is entitled to breast-feed her 
baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is 
permitted.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005).   
 
120
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Derungs II, 374 
F.3d at 439).   
 
121
 See id. at 623-24 (per curiam). 
 
122
 Id. at 632 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 
123
 Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
124
 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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V.  NAVIGATING THE LITIGATION OF A LACTATION DISCRIMINATION CASE IN OHIO 
Given the fact that the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to articulate whether 
lactation discrimination is included within the scope of the Ohio FEPA, as amended 
by the Ohio PDA,125 lactating employee plaintiffs must guess as to what the 
appropriate litigation strategy is that they should utilize in future cases.  Incidentally, 
since the Supreme Court of Ohio did not completely forestall the application of the 
Ohio FEPA to lactation discrimination cases,126 this section will explore the key 
aspects that should make up a plausible argument for relief to a lactating employee 
plaintiff who has been discriminated against in the workplace.   
Lactation discrimination in the workplace is an issue of first impression in Ohio.  
Consequently, an argument to provide protection against lactation discrimination 
must be developed against the relevant federal case law127 that has applied the 
federal PDA.  It is useful to evaluate the federal case law interpreting the federal 
PDA in order to better understand how the Ohio PDA would be applied to similar 
contingencies.  This methodology is logical because “the Ohio PDA is governed by 
the same principles that govern the federal claim of pregnancy discrimination.”128   
A.  Lactation Is Not Equivalent to Breastfeeding 
One federal court has held that the type of discrimination prohibited by Title VII 
and the federal PDA needs to be based upon “the gender-specific biological 
functions of pregnancy and child-bearing.”129  While federal courts have been 
reluctant to classify breastfeeding as a protected status under the federal PDA,130 
these courts have not been faced with the argument that there is a significant 
distinction between breastfeeding and lactation. 
Federal courts have often resorted to dismissing breastfeeding discrimination 
claims on the basis that breastfeeding is a choice.131  These federal courts have 
determined that breastfeeding is a form of childrearing rather than a biological 
function of pregnancy.132  Therefore, it is important to distinguish breastfeeding from 
lactation.  The argument that lactation and breastfeeding are separate and distinct 
was made in the Totes/Isotoner case,133 however, the trial court failed to recognize 
                                                          
 
125
 See Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d 622 (per curiam). 
 
126
 See id. 
 
127
 See generally Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Fejes v. 
Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Colo. 1997); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. 
Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990). 
 
128
 Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 Fed. App’x 74, 81 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 
129
 Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).  
Further, the court held that the PDA does not include “an individual’s choice to care for a 
child” because this choice does not constitute “a ‘medical condition’ related to childbirth or 
pregnancy.”  Id.    
 
130
 See generally Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305; Fejes, 960 F. Supp. 1487; Wallace, 789 F. 
Supp. 867. 
 
131
 See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305. 
 
132
 See id. 
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the legal implications between these two terms.  Instead, the trial court incorrectly 
relied on Derungs and made the illogical statement that: 
Allen gave birth over five months prior to her termination from Totes. 
Pregnant [women] who give birth and chose not to breastfeed or pump 
their breasts do not continue to lactate for five months.  Thus, Allen’s 
condition of lactating was not a condition relating to pregnancy but rather 
a condition relating to breastfeeding.134 
Justice O’Connor noted that she found “that conclusion curious and inaccurate.”135  
She stated, “given the physiological aspects of lactation, I have little trouble 
concluding that lactation also has a clear, undeniable nexus with pregnancy and with 
childbirth.”136  Conversely, breastfeeding is a social behavior, rather than a purely 
biological process, defined as feeding a child from a mother’s breast.137  A cause of 
action exists in a lactation discrimination case when an employer does not treat a 
lactating employee “the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”138  In 
contrast, a breastfeeding discrimination case would likely be premised on 
childrearing discrimination.139 
                                                          
 
133
 Totes/Isotoner trial court, No. CV06-03-0917, slip op. at 6 (Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 
July 31, 2007), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009). 
 
134
 Id. at 7. 
 
135
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  Justice O’Connor continues defining lactation as a biological function: 
Lactation—the formation and secretion of milk by the mammary glands—is believed 
to be stimulated by prolactin, a hormone.  During pregnancy, the level of prolactin in a 
woman is inhibited by high levels of estrogen and progesterone.  Following delivery, 
levels of estrogen and progesterone in the woman fall while the level of prolactin 
remains high.  Prolactin then stimulates and maintains the production of milk.  
 
Colostrum, a substance that contains more protein and less fat and sugar than breast 
milk, is secreted by the breasts during pregnancy and in the days immediately 
following childbirth.  Milk production begins thereafter, usually on the third or fourth 
postpartum day, and breast milk appears.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
136
 Id. 
 
137
 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/breastfeeding (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).  
 
138
 Fortier v. U.S. Steel Group, No. 01-2029, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11788, at *8 (W.D. 
Pa. June 4, 2002) (omission in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).  Federal 
courts have held that employees with temporary disabilities are “similar in their ability or 
inability to work” when compared to pregnant employees.  See, e.g., Meyer v. Brown & Root 
Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding the defendant employer failed to treat 
pregnant employee plaintiff in the “same manner as other temporarily disabled workers”). 
 
139
 For example, an employee may be treated adversely by her employer without fear of 
engaging in pregnancy discrimination if she requests additional time off work to breastfeed 
her child or if her request to bring her child to work during her breaks to breastfeed on the 
employer’s premises is denied.  Discrimination on the basis of childrearing or childcare is not 
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B.  Lactation Discrimination Is Included Within the Scope of Ohio’s Pregnancy 
Discrimination Statute 
1.  A Plain Meaning Approach 
Statutory interpretation begins and ends with an analysis of the plain meaning of 
the words a legislature has chosen to utilize in the statute.140  A close examination of 
the legislative intent and statutory construction of Ohio’s employment discrimination 
statutes reveals that lactation discrimination should be included within the scope of 
these two statutes.  The Ohio FEPA states that it is unlawful: 
For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, 
national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge 
without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against 
that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.141 
The Ohio FEPA was subsequently amended by the Ohio PDA, which states that:  
[T]he terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” include, but are 
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising 
out of and occurring during the course of a pregnancy [or] childbirth . . . .  
Women affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth . . . shall be treated the 
same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so 
affected . . . .142 
When courts are construing a statute, they “start with the assumption that the 
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words.”143  In this 
statute, the language has been broadly constructed.  For instance, rather than simply 
using the phrase “because of pregnancy” the legislature deliberately chose to use the 
more expansive language “because of or on the basis of pregnancy.”144  This trend of 
utilizing broad language continues with the language “women affected by pregnancy 
[or] childbirth,”145 rather than more constrictive language such as “pregnant women.”   
A lactating woman is certainly a “woman affected by pregnancy” because women do 
                                                          
likely to be considered sex discrimination because both men and women can provide childcare 
duties.  Childcare responsibilities do not have a basis in sex-specific biological differences.  
Conversely, lactation does have a basis in sex-specific biological differences because only 
females have the capability to lactate. 
 
140
 See Kevin Schwin, Note, Toward a Plain Meaning Approach to Analyzing Title VII: 
Employment Discrimination Protection Of Transsexuals, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645, 667 
(2009) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 
which we are governed.”)). 
 
141
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2008) (emphasis added). 
 
142
 Id. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
 
143
 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).   
 
144
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B). 
 
145
 Id. 
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not spontaneously lactate without first becoming pregnant and experiencing 
childbirth.  As Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion, “affected” is an 
“expansive term[].”146  The term “related” is also “a generous choice of wording, 
suggesting that interpretation should favor inclusion rather than exclusion in the 
close cases.”147  A lactating woman lactates “because of or on the basis of [her] 
pregnancy.”  Furthermore, she is a woman “affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth.”  
The expansive diction used in this statute supports the logical conclusion that the 
Ohio FEPA, as amended by the Ohio PDA, was designed to protect lactating 
women.  
It is logical to broadly interpret both the Ohio FEPA and the Ohio PDA in order 
to include the status of lactation as a protected class within these civil rights statutes.  
The Ohio PDA is almost identically worded when compared to its federal 
counterpart.  Courts have recognized that the federal PDA is a remedial statute that 
should be liberally construed.148  As such, the Ohio PDA should also be liberally 
construed.  The Ohio State Legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court have maintained 
that the Ohio civil rights statutes should be liberally construed.149  Many federal 
courts have also stated that the federal civil rights counterpart Title VII, which the 
Ohio civil rights statutes are based on, “is a remedial statute which should be 
liberally construed.”150  The tendency to broadly interpret civil rights statutes 
supports the argument that lactation discrimination fits into the broad definitions of 
sex discrimination under FEPA and, consequently, pregnancy discrimination under 
the Ohio PDA. 
The Ohio PDA contains language that expressly states that protection is provided 
to the categories of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.151  
Additionally, the statutory language signals the reader to interpret that these three 
categories of protected-status that are not meant to be an exhaustive list.  Both the 
federal and Ohio PDAs contain a “not limited to” clause placed directly before these 
                                                          
 
146
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 629 (Ohio 2009)  (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  Justice O’Connor further defines “affected” as “[having] produce[d] a material 
influence upon.”  Id. (alteration in original) (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 19 (10th ed. 1993)).  
 
147
 Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 
148
 See, e.g., Williams v. Macfrugal’s Bargains-Close-Outs, Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 100 
(Ct. App. 1998) (“There is no question but that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) (42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed.”). 
 
149
 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (West 2008); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Lysyj, 
313 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ohio 1974) (“R.C. 4112.02(G) and 4112.01(I) are remedial statutes and are 
unbounded by the rules of strict construction that governed R.C. 2901.35.  When determining 
the scope of the “public accommodations” amendments to Chapter 4112, the commission, 
initially, and the courts, upon review, are to construe those statutes liberally in order to 
effectuate the legislative purpose and fundamental policy implicit in their enactment, and to 
assure that the rights granted by the statutes are not defeated by overly restrictive 
interpretation.” (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11)). 
 
150
 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 
151
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009). 
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three categories.152  If the Ohio Legislature intended to limit the coverage of the Ohio 
PDA to only pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions, an argument can 
be made that the Ohio Legislature would have refrained from including the federal 
“not limited to” language in the state statute.153  Thus far, the “not limited to” clauses 
of either versions of the PDA have yet to be interpreted by a federal or Ohio court.154  
A plain reading of the Ohio PDA reveals its expansive statutory language and 
supports the conclusion that the Ohio Legislature intended that the statutory 
language be interpreted broadly to cover biological processes such as lactation, 
which is highly related to pregnancy. 
2.  The Legislative History and Intent 
The Sixth Circuit noted that the Ohio legislature integrated the federal “PDA’s 
language almost verbatim into the definitional provisions of § 4112.”155  Therefore, 
the federal legislative intent and history can be extrapolated to provide insight into 
the intent behind the Ohio PDA.156  As Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring 
opinion, the Ohio court in Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. looked to the congressional 
record in order to understand the legislative intent of the federal PDA.157  Since the 
Ohio PDA was passed two years after the federal PDA, it can be assumed that the 
Ohio Legislature was aware of the corresponding federal legislative history.  If the 
Ohio Legislature disapproved of this legislative history, it could have overridden the 
federal legislative intent with its own state level legislative history.  The argument 
that the Ohio civil rights statutes were devised to include protection for lactating 
employees is supported by Title VII’s overarching policy objective of eliminating 
barriers to equal opportunities for all employees in the workplace.158 
                                                          
 
152
 Id. (defining the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” while stating that 
these terms “include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, . . . 
childbirth, or related medical conditions”). 
 
153
 See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties for 
Pregnancy, Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355, 377 (1999) (arguing that 
federal courts have concluded that breastfeeding is not “pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions [to pregnancy]” and ignored the “plain language” of the federal PDA, 
which expressly states that discrimination should not be limited to these factors). 
 
154
 See id. (asserting that no federal court has interpreted the “not limited to” clause of the 
federal PDA). 
 
155
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 
156
 “The amended statutory framework now embodied in Ohio’s FEPA developed similarly 
to its federal counterpart . . . the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.”  Allen v. 
Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d. 622, 628 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
157
 Id. at 628 (citing Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Ill. 
1994)).  “The essential command of the PDA is that an employer must maintain the same 
neutrality towards an employee’s pregnancy as it would . . . [any] other protected-class 
status.”  Id. 
 
158
 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (“The objective of 
Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute.  It was to 
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the 
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”). 
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Lactation is defined as the “[p]eriod following birth during which milk is secreted 
in the breasts.”159  The congressional record mentions that “‘the PDA gives a woman 
the right . . . to be financially and legally protected before, during and after her 
pregnancy.’”160  Even federal courts that have been hostile toward the idea of 
extending Title VII protection to breastfeeding discrimination claims have conceded 
that the federal PDA “does not require plaintiff to be pregnant when the alleged 
discrimination occurs.”161  The legislative intent indicates that physiological and 
biological aftereffects of pregnancy, such as lactation, were legislatively intended to 
be protected under the PDA.   
The Congressional record expressly excluded the federal PDA from a few 
applications that are highly related to pregnancy.  For example, the Congressional 
Record addressed the fear that plaintiffs would attempt to use the federal PDA to 
force employers to pay for abortions.  Congress prevented this application of the 
statute by stating on the record that the federal PDA expressly limits its application 
to this contingency.162  When the Ohio Legislature adopted its version of the PDA it 
could have followed Congress’s example by expressly excluding the statute’s 
application to contingencies involving breastfeeding or lactation discrimination.  The 
Ohio Legislature did not expressly exclude these potentially protected categories.  
Therefore, the legislative history and intent support the inclusion of lactation 
discrimination as a cognizable claim that can be brought under the Ohio PDA. 
The timeline of the enactment of the federal PDA and the subsequent enactment 
of the Ohio PDA combined with its implication on the Ohio legislative intent must 
be clearly explained.  The Derungs court misinterpreted this legislative history when 
it analyzed the impact that the federal PDA had on the Ohio PDA’s legislative intent.  
The Sixth Circuit stated:  
[W]hen the Ohio Legislature amended the “because of sex” and “on the 
basis of sex” definition, Gilbert had not been expressly overruled by the 
Supreme Court.  Newport News came three years later. . . .   
 
                                                          
 
159
 See Medical Dictionary, WEBMD (emphasis added), http://dictionary.webmd.com/ 
terms/lactation (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).  Lactation is also defined by in terms of its 
biological description as the “[p]roduction of milk.”  Id.   
 
160
 See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 153, at 370 n.94 (omission in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38574 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Sarasin)).   
 
161
 Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Colo. 1997).  The plaintiff 
can still be a member of a protected class even though she was not pregnant at the time of the 
adverse employment action.  Id. at 1492-93.  The Fejes court stated: 
The statute does not specify whether the discrimination must occur during the 
pregnancy.  However, to read Title VII so narrowly would lead to absurd results such 
as “prohibit[ing] an employer from firing a woman during her pregnancy but 
permit[ing] the employer to terminate her the day after delivery if the reason for 
termination was that the woman became pregnant in the first place.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Donaldson v. Am. Banco Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1463-
64 (D. Colo. 1996)). 
 
162
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 7 (1978). 
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Having incorporated the PDA’s language almost verbatim into the 
definitional provisions of § 4112, it is clear to us that the Ohio Legislature 
was aware of the meaning and rationale of Gilbert, as well as being aware 
of the [federal] PDA.  The Legislature made a conscious choice to extend 
the definition of discrimination to include pregnancy even though there 
cannot be a class of similarly situated males.  In making this choice, 
however, the Legislature extended the definition of discrimination in the 
employment context only.163 
The reasoning behind the Sixth Circuit’s legislative timeline is incorrect because 
Congress, not the Supreme Court, initially rejected the Gilbert analysis when it 
enacted the federal PDA.  In fact, the Court in Newport News explained that 
Congress, in enacting the PDA, both rejected the Gilbert result and endorsed the 
reasoning and interpretation of the dissenting opinions.164  The Ohio legislature did 
not need to wait for the Supreme Court’s Newport News decision to understand that 
the Gilbert analysis had already been rejected by the passage of the federal PDA.  At 
the time of Ohio PDA’s enactment, the Ohio Legislature intended for the Ohio PDA 
to reflect its analogous rejection of the Gilbert analysis at the state level.165  
Therefore, applying a Gilbert analysis to a case involving the Ohio PDA is improper 
and goes against the Ohio Legislature’s legislative intent.  
After the Derungs decision, the Ohio Legislature apparently did not feel it was 
necessary to amend the PDA to expressly include lactation or breastfeeding as a 
protected class because the Sixth Circuit’s decision indicated that the employment 
sections of Ohio’s civil rights statutes were amended by the PDA.166  Consequently, 
the Ohio Legislature deemed that the Ohio civil rights statutes already protected 
breastfeeding women in an employment context, but concluded that a legislative 
amendment was necessary to protect women who breastfeed in places of public 
accommodation.  The Ohio legislature partially overruled the Derungs court when it 
amended Ohio’s building code legislation to protect breastfeeding mothers from 
discrimination in a public accommodation context.167  It is inappropriate for an Ohio 
court to apply the Gilbert analysis or the analysis from Derungs to a lactation 
discrimination case because the reasoning behind both cases has been rejected by the 
Ohio legislature. 
C.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
The best way to ensure all lactating employees are protected in the workplace is 
through additional federal legislation.  As recently as 2009, there was pending 
                                                          
 
163
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 
164
 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-77 (1983) 
(noting that Congress enacted the PDA in order to explicitly reject the majority analysis of the 
Court in Gilbert); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3:12, at 113 (1994). 
 
165
 Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 629 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  “In rendering their 
decisions [in the Derungs I and II cases], the federal courts applied the Gilbert analysis that 
has been rejected expressly by both Congress and the Ohio Legislature.”  Id. (citing Derungs 
I, 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889-92 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aff’d, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 
 
166
 Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 436-37. 
 
167
 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005).   
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federal legislation to amend Title VII in the form of H.R. Res. 2819, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  This legislation would have amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 
inserting the words “including lactation” after “childbirth.”168  It also would have 
defined lactation as “a condition that may result in the feeding of a child directly 
from the breast or the expressing of milk from the breast.”169  Since this proposed 
federal legislation continues to fail, Ohio’s General Assembly could adopt 
legislation similar to one of the twenty-four states170 that have enacted laws to 
provide protection to breastfeeding mothers in the workplace.  For instance, Vermont 
requires employers to provide reasonable time throughout the day for nursing 
mothers to express breast milk for three years after the birth of a child.171  It also 
requires employers to make a reasonable accommodation to provide an appropriate 
private space that is not a bathroom stall, and prohibits discrimination against an 
employee who exercises rights provided under this act.172 
The recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act173 included 
new federal protections for lactating employees.  This new legislation amends the 
Fair Labor Standards Act to require reasonable unpaid breaks for nursing 
employees.174  This legislation fails to protect all lactating employees.  For example, 
employers with fewer than fifty employees are not subject to these requirements if 
they can demonstrate that they would cause an undue hardship on the employer.175  
Furthermore, since this legislation amends the FLSA instead of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, the legislation fails to protect employees from lactation discrimination 
itself.  Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Totes/ Isotoner stands as the 
relevant law in Ohio, and lactating employees remain uncertain about whether they 
are protected from lactation discrimination.  Although an employer is now required 
to accommodate a lactating employee, without explicit protection from lactation 
discrimination, this employer is free to refuse to hire lactating employees altogether 
or engage in adverse employment practices toward lactating employees.176   
                                                          
 
168
 H.R. Res. 2819, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 
169
 Id. 
 
170
 The states that have laws related to breastfeeding in the workplace are: Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.  This is in addition 
to the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.  See Breastfeeding Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGS. (Sept. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/BreastfeedingLaws/tabid/ 
14389/Default.aspx.  
 
171
 VT. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 305 (2008). 
 
172
 Id. § 305(a), (c). 
 
173
 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). 
 
174
 The amendment to the FLSA provides that employers must furnish a private location, 
other than a restroom, which may be used by the employee to express breast milk.  Id. § 
207(r)(1).  
 
175
 Id. § 207(r)(3). 
 
176
 These adverse employment actions could include demoting, refusing to promote, 
refusing to give pay raises to lactating employees only.   
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to affirm the summary judgment in favor 
of Totes opened the door for employers to implement facially discriminatory 
employment policies that single out lactating women.  Because the court did not 
decide whether discrimination on the basis of lactation is prohibited by Ohio’s 
FEPA, as amended by the Ohio PDA, Ohio’s courts of appeals will likely conflict 
over this issue in the future.  The Supreme Court of Ohio should establish that 
discrimination on the basis of lactation is considered pregnancy discrimination under 
Ohio law as “lactation is ‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy’ and that women 
who are lactating are women ‘affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth.’”177    
 
                                                          
 
177
 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (alteration in original).    
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